LECTURE: PROF. WANG Yunjie
announcer: 殳妮 release time: 2025-03-20 views: 141
TIME: 2025/3/25 10:00-11:00
VENUE: 317 E&F HALL
Title: Information Sharing and Manufacturer RebateCompetition
Abstract: We investigate the incentive for a retailer to share private demand information with two rebate-offering manufacturers who sell substitutable products through the retailer. We show that the retailer’s incentive to share information depends on the proportion of rebate-sensitive consumers, the competition intensity, and whether the retailer can charge a side payment for sharing the information. When the retailer cannot charge a side payment, he will not voluntarily share information with a monopolistic manufacturer, but he may do so with none, one, or both of the manufacturers when there is competition. Interestingly, we find that more intense competition or a smaller proportion of rebate-sensitive consumers may benefit a manufacturer if it induces the retailer to share information with her. When the retailer can charge a side payment, we consider two cases: concurrent contracting and sequential contracting with the manufacturers for sharing the information. We show that the retailer always prefers concurrent contracting, which induces the system-optimal information sharing decision, over sequential contracting.
Bio of the seminar speaker:
WANG Yunjie, Assistant Professor, Renmin Business School, Renmin University of China
